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Competitiveness and Employment 
Protection and Creation
An Overview of Collective Bargaining 
in the United States
Richard N. Block
Michigan State University
A discussion of the relationship between collective bargaining,
competitiveness, and employment protection and creation in the United
States can be undertaken only in the context of a thorough understand-
ing of the institutions governing and affecting the collective bargaining
in the United States. There is no actor, institution, or subsystem in the
United States that encourages the collective bargaining system to be
used for those—or any—purposes. Public policy in the United States
neither encourages nor discourages collective bargaining as a method
of establishing terms and conditions of employment. Rather, public
policy is designed to protect the choice of employees as to whether
they wish to be represented by a union or labor organization for the
purposes of collective bargaining.1
When employees are represented for collective bargaining pur-
poses by a union, there is no government involvement in establishing
the outcomes of bargaining. As a result, the major characteristic of the
U.S. collective bargaining system is variation. From the viewpoint of
firms, competitiveness can be obtained through collective bargaining
or through other mechanisms. Put differently, there may be multiple
paths to competitiveness for a firm, and the collective bargaining sys-
tem is but one of those paths.
The main purpose of this overview is to explore the nature of the
collective bargaining environment in the United States as it relates to
the use of the collective bargaining system for encouraging competi-
tiveness and employment protection/creation. To that end, the next sec-
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tion will explore that environment. The third section will present a
brief overview of some of the literature on the incidence of the use of
the collective bargaining system in the United States as a vehicle for
competitiveness and employment protection/creation. The final section
will present a summary and conclusions.
THE ENVIRONMENT FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 
COMPETITIVENESS, AND EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTION/CREATION
Collective bargaining by individual firms and unions, which
affects competitiveness and employment protection/creation, is heavily
influenced by the environments in which the labor relations system
must exist. Indeed, there are several environments that exert an impact
on the relationship between collective bargaining for competitiveness
and employment protection/creation. These environments associated
with collective bargaining include the legal, political, institutional, and
economic. Each of these will be examined.
The Legal Environment
By far the most important influence on the collective bargaining
system in the United States is the law; in this case, the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) as amended in 1947 and then again in 1959.
The law establishes the overall framework for the collective bargaining
system in the United States. The influence and reach of the law derives
from the fact that it is accessible, covers almost all firms in the private
sector outside of the railroad and airline industries, and is public. The
law’s accessibility means that all have access to its process. Its broad
coverage results in a broad application, and its public nature means that
the decisions that emanate from it are known by the labor relations
community and can be used to influence other decisions and shape new
legal arguments. Therefore, parties acting through their attorneys have
a common information base on what is illegal, what is legal, and what
is debatable. 
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The law establishes the basic structure for collective bargaining,
the procedural obligations of parties to negotiate, and the matters about
which they must negotiate. Equally important, it establishes the param-
eters within which government may intercede in the bargaining process
to encourage the parties to negotiate substantive terms or conditions of
employment, such as those that influence competitiveness and employ-
ment protection/creation. 
Historical Overview of Labor Law in the United States
The basic legislation governing labor relations in the United States,
the NLRA, was enacted in 1935. Although the purposes of the act have
been the subject of much debate (Keyserling 1945; Millis and Brown
1950; Block 1995, 1997), one obvious reason for the passage of the
law was to create an orderly process for determining whether a group
of employees wished to be represented by a union for collective pur-
poses.
An important assumption underlying the U.S. industrial relations
system was reflected in this basic purpose. Employees would only be
represented by a union if they wished to be so represented. Collective
bargaining and union representation were not presumed to be the
method by which terms and conditions of employment were normally
established. Rather, such terms and conditions of employment were
normally established by the employer unilaterally or by individual
employer negotiation with employees. 
The 1935 act also established the concept of a bargaining unit. The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency established to
administer the NLRA, was given the responsibility to determine if any
unit (such as a group of employees) was appropriate for bargaining,
and if so, whether the employees in that unit desire representation. A
bargaining unit could only be an “employer unit, craft unit, plant unit,
or subdivision thereof” (NLRA, Sec. 9(a)). In order to be considered
appropriate, the employees being considered for union representation
were required to have a “community of interest,” common employment
interests such as similar wage structure, similar tasks, and similar
supervision.
In its early years, the NLRB used card checks to determine if the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit desired union representa-
tion. The board agent would match signed union cards to a list of
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employees provided by the employer. By the early 1940s, the board
had established the representation election as the preferred method of
determining representation (Millis and Brown 1950). Thus, by the
early 1940s, the bargaining unit could accurately be labeled an election
unit, which would be a bargaining unit only if the employees in that
unit chose a union to represent them for collective purposes.
Union representation would exist only if a majority of the employ-
ees desired to be so represented. Moreover, as the law would later
evolve, it would also be determined that the desire for unionization
must be continuing. Thus, if a majority of the employees in a bargain-
ing unit at some point decided that they no longer wished union repre-
sentation, such representation would be ended.
The result is that the legal structure in the United States creates a
unit-by-unit, workplace-by-workplace process for unionization and, as
will be seen, for bargaining. Moreover, once union representation is
established in a unit, the employer has an obligation to bargain only
with the union representing the employees in that unit. There is no obli-
gation to bargain with any other union or labor organization for
employees not in that unit, and the union or labor organization may not
negotiate for employees who are outside that unit unless those other
employees are represented by a union and agree to so negotiate, the
employees are added (accreted) to the existing bargaining unit through
a legal proceeding, or the employer agrees to negotiate with an existing
union for those employees and, if challenged, all legal standards for
unit accretion are met.
The NLRA was extensively amended in 1947 via the Taft-Hartley
Act. For the purpose of this study, the 1947 amendments changed the
1935 law in three key ways. First, the 1947 amendments established
the representation election as the preferred method of determining
whether a unit of employees wished to be represented by a union. Con-
sistent with this preference, card checks would only be used under
extraordinary circumstances, such as when a fair election was impossi-
ble due to the employer’s extensive unfair labor practices (NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 [1969]). Second, the 1947 amend-
ments gave employers rights of free speech. Thereafter, employer
expressions of sentiment against unionization would not be viewed as
unlawful unless accompanied by a direct or implied threat of job loss
or promise of benefit. Third, the Taft-Hartley amendments refined the
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obligation of the employer to bargain with the union by providing that
the parties were required to meet at reasonable times and to discuss
matters related to terms and conditions of employment. On the other
hand, the amendment provided that neither party had an obligation to
agree to any proposal. As will be discussed below, these three changes
would have an impact on bargaining for competitiveness and employ-
ment protection/creation (Millis and Brown 1950; Block, Beck, and
Kruger 1996).
Lesser amendments to the NLRA were enacted in 1958 and 1974.
The 1958 amendments are relevant to this study only to the extent that
they placed some limitations on the rights of unions to engage in recog-
nized organizational picketing. The 1974 amendments brought
employees of nonprofit, private health care institutions under the
NLRA.2
Law and Bargaining Structure
One result of the system of establishing union representation on a
unit-by-unit basis is the absence of an overarching structure for collec-
tive bargaining. Because the legal bargaining units are the basic build-
ing blocks of the collective bargaining system, the result has been the
creation of a highly decentralized system of collective bargaining in
the United Sates based on the plant-by-plant, unit-by-unit certification
process. Each legal bargaining unit negotiates terms and conditions of
employment only for those employees in the bargaining unit unless all
affected parties explicitly and unambiguously agree to a more inclusive
bargaining structure. Even when such an inclusive bargaining structure
exists, any or all parties can leave the multiemployer or multiunion
structure at the termination of the collective agreement (Evening News
Association 1965; Detroit Newspaper Agency 1998).
This unit-by-unit system of establishing bargaining is important to
the relationship between collective bargaining, competitiveness, and
employment protection/creation because it creates a system under
which employers have substantial flexibility and discretion in making
decisions regarding competitiveness. The unit-by-unit representation
system and the default system of “no union” means that there is no nec-
essary relationship between unionization in the facilities of a firm. The
mere fact that one facility of an employer is unionized does not mean
that other facilities of the employer are unionized. This occurs because
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in most cases, the bargaining or election unit is the plant/facility or sub-
division thereof. Many firms have both unionized and nonunion facili-
ties, and some firms have facilities represented by different unions. On
occasion, more than one union may represent different classifications
of employees in one facility.
This system gives many employers competitiveness options away
from the union in addition to negotiating with the union. Alternatively,
multiple unions within a firm raise the possibility of employer use of
coercive comparisons, comparing the willingness of one union or local
to compromise with the willingness of other unions or locals to com-
promise. These options can provide employers with a disincentive to
compromise with unions during negotiations on matters that might be
thought to enhance competitiveness and employment protection. In the
alternative, these options can provide employers with leverage during
negotiations. Such leverage makes it less likely than otherwise that
direct employment protection or creation that would normally benefit
unions will be incorporated into collective agreements. At the same
time, such a situation can also provide unions with leverage over
employers where the union has organized a key facility.
In general, however, cooperation occurs only if both parties are
interested in cooperation. On the other hand, if one party is uninter-
ested in cooperation, the legal system will not encourage it—in fact, it
will resist it.
Law and the Bargaining Process
A central premise of collective bargaining law in the United States
is government noninterference in the bargaining process. The law does
require both parties to bargain in “good faith.” But, as amended in
1947, the NLRA explicitly states that the obligation to bargain in good
faith “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession” (NLRA as amended, Section 8(d)). As the
U.S. Supreme Court noted in a key 1960 decision, commenting on the
1947 debate around legislation that would clarify the obligation to bar-
gain in the 1935 law:
the nature of the duty to bargain in good faith thus imposed upon
employers . . . was not sweepingly conceived. The Chairman of
the Senate Committee declared: “When the employees have cho-
sen their organization, when they have selected their representa-
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tives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of
their employer and say, ‘Here they are, the legal representatives of
your employees.’ What happens behind those doors is not
inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.”
The limitation implied by the last sentence has not been in prac-
tice maintained – practically, it could hardly have been – but the
underlying purpose of the remark has remained the most basic
purpose of the statutory provision . . . Congress was generally not
concerned with the substantive terms on which the parties con-
tracted. (NLRB v. Insurance Agents International Union, 361 U.S.
477 [1960, 484–487])
Legislation passed in 1947 is equally clear regarding what the par-
ties are obligated to do in bargaining, and what they are not obligated
to do.
To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obliga-
tion of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereun-
der, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obliga-
tion does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession. (NLRA, Section 8d)
United States labor law does not require either party to agree to
any proposal made by the other party, including any matter
regarding competitiveness and employment protection/creation.
Labor law only requires each party to negotiate in good faith over
matters involving terms and conditions of employment, so that
parties must discuss employment protection and competitiveness,
at least to the extent that competitiveness is germane to terms and
conditions of employment. 
Thus, labor law in the United States enables the parties to use col-
lective bargaining to agree on issues relating to competitiveness and
employment protection/creation, but only if both wish to do so.
Equally important, it also enables either party not to address these
issues, if that party believes that it will be better off by declining to
agree, provided that the party negotiates in good faith. The NLRA is
indifferent to the bargaining outcomes on matters of employment pro-
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tection and competitiveness, just as it is indifferent to the outcomes on
any other specific issue. 
In addition to this laissez-faire approach to the subjects of bargain-
ing, labor law provides parties a wide range of weapons to pursue their
self-interest. As the Supreme Court noted:
(I) It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system
where the government does not attempt to control the results of
negotiations . . . The parties—even granting the modification of
views that may come from a realization of economic interdepen-
dence—still proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic
viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not
reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect under-
standing among people would lead to perfect agreement among
them on values. The presence of economic weapons in reserve,
and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and
parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft–Hartley Acts have
recognized. Abstract logical analysis might find inconsistency
between the command of the statute to negotiate toward an agree-
ment in good faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic
weapons, frequently having the most serious effect upon individ-
ual workers and productive enterprises, to induce one party to
come to the terms desired by the other. But the truth of the matter
is that at the present statutory stage of our national labor relations
policy, the two factors—necessity for good-faith bargaining
between parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices
to each to make the other party incline to agree on one’s terms—
exist side by side. (NLRB v. Insurance Agents International
Union, 361 U.S. [1960, 488–489]) 
This panoply of economic weapons includes strikes by unions, and
lockouts and the use permanent replacements by employers (NLRB v.
MacKay Radio and Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 477 [1938]; American
Shipbuilding v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 [1965]; TWA v. Independent Fed-
eration of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 [1989]). Unions can only
obtain employment protection when employers see it as in their interest
to grant it, or when they are able to extract it by force. Thus, if one
party wishes to resist the use of the collective bargaining process to
encourage competitiveness and employment protection/creation, the
law permits that party to use the weapons to do so.
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Law and the Obligation to Bargain over Substantive Matters
The NLRA as amended requires employers and unions to bargain
in good faith over matters involving wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. In 1958, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that neither party had an obligation to bargain over matters not relating
to terms or conditions of employment (NLRB v. Wooster Division of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 [1958]). In this case, the Court cre-
ated implicitly three categories of subjects: mandatory, permissive, and
unlawful. Mandatory subjects were those relating to terms and condi-
tions of employment that the parties were required to discuss, although
there was no obligation to agree. Permissive subjects were those that
the parties could discuss if both parties so desired; however, neither
party was under an obligation to discuss them. Unlawful subjects were
not permitted to be discussed or incorporated into a collective agree-
ment. A later decision by a lower court, permitted to stand by the
Supreme Court, reinforced the distinction between mandatory and per-
missive subjects of bargaining by holding that one party could not
force another party to negotiate over a nonmandatory item by with-
holding agreement on a mandatory item subject to agreement on the
nonmandatory item. (International Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB,
320 F.2d 615, 3rd cir.; [1963]) 
The importance of these decisions soon became clear. Employers
need only bargain over matters involving terms and conditions of
employment, which, in turn, meant that they could act unilaterally in
matters not involving terms and conditions of employment. There
ensued extensive litigation over the type of decisions that would be
considered terms and conditions of employment (NLRB v. Adams
Dairy, Inc. 350 F.2d 108 [CA 8; 1965]; NLRB v. Royal Plating and
Polishing Co. 350 F.2d 191 [CA 3; 1965]; First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB 452 U.S. 668 [1981]). To the extent that employers
were able to use the legal system to remove matters from the category
“terms and conditions of employment,” their flexibility would be sub-
stantially enhanced, and they could make decisions without negotiating
with a union about those decisions. On the other hand, if a matter was
determined to be a “term or condition of employment,” employers
were required to negotiate with the union over decisions involving
those matters.
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The most heated legal battles were fought over decisions that were
traditionally considered in the United States to be the prerogative of
management, but that also had an effect on employment. In the first
key post–Borg-Warner case, Fibreboard v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964), the Supreme Court determined that the employer’s decision to
contract out its maintenance work that had previously been done by
bargaining unit employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In
this case, the firm had replaced its unionized employees with those of a
contractor. The company had determined that it cost less to have the
maintenance work done by a contractor than the bargaining unit
employees, and the employer believed that the union would not agree
to a contract that resulted in reduced cost.
The Court agreed with the board that this subcontracting was
merely the replacement of one group of employees with another based
solely on labor cost. Both groups of employees would be doing pre-
cisely the same work, under the same conditions, with the same tools.
It was a mere replacement of one group of employees for another. In
deciding this case, however, the Court also observed:
The subject matter of the present dispute is well within the literal
meaning of the phrase “terms and conditions of employment.” A
stipulation with respect to the contracting out of work performed
by members of the bargaining unit might appropriately be called a
‘condition of employment.’ The words even more plainly cover
termination of employment which, as the facts of this case indi-
cate, necessarily results from the contracting out of work per-
formed by members of the established bargaining unit. (379 U.S.
203, 210)
This last sentence seemed to suggest that any employer decision
that resulted in the termination of employment was a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining. On the other hand, the facts of Fibreboard were suf-
ficiently narrow as to generate legal doubt regarding whether that last
statement applied to any employer decision, or only to contracting out
decisions similar to that taken in Fibreboard, the mere replacement of
one group of employees with another group, with the decision to
replace based solely on labor costs.
Seventeen years later, the Supreme Court appeared to adopt a posi-
tion opposite to Fibreboard in First National Maintenance Corpora-
tion v. NLRB. In that case, the employer, who provided cleaning and
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maintenance services for commercial customers, refused to bargain
with its unionized employees about a decision to withdraw from a con-
tract at Greenpark, a nursing home. The dispute with Greenpark was
solely over the size of the fee that First National Maintenance would
receive. In deciding that the employer had no obligation to bargain
over the decision to withdraw from its Greenpark contract, the Court
observed:
In establishing what issues must be submitted to the process of
bargaining, Congress had no expectation that the elected union
representative would become an equal partner in the running of
the business enterprise in which the union’s members are
employed. Despite the deliberate open-endedness of the statutory
language, there is an undeniable limit to the subjects about which
bargaining must take place: . . .
(The Employer) contends it had no duty to bargain about its deci-
sion to terminate its operations at Greenpark. This contention
requires that we determine whether the decision itself should be
considered part of petitioner’s retained freedom to manage its
affairs unrelated to employment. The aim of . . . labeling a matter
a mandatory subject of bargaining, rather than simply permitting,
but not requiring, bargaining, is to “promote the fundamental pur-
pose of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor
and management within the framework established by Congress
as most conducive to industrial peace,” . . . The concept of manda-
tory bargaining is premised on the belief that collective discus-
sions backed by the parties’ economic weapons will result in
decisions that are better for both management and labor and for
society as a whole . . . This will be true, however, only if the sub-
ject proposed for discussion is amenable to resolution through the
bargaining process. Management must be free from the con-
straints of the bargaining process . . . to the extent essential for the
running of a profitable business. It also must have some degree of
certainty beforehand as to when it may proceed to reach decisions
without fear of later evaluations labeling its conduct an unfair
labor practice. Congress did not explicitly state what issues of
mutual concern to union and management it intended to exclude
from mandatory bargaining. Nonetheless, in view of an
employer’s need for unencumbered decision making, bargaining
over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the
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continued availability of employment should be required only if
the benefit, for labor–management relations and the collective-
bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct
of the business. (452 U.S. 666, 674–679)
In other words, if the employer believed that its competitive inter-
ests, the conduct of business, would be impaired by a requirement that
it must bargain with the union over the decision, and it prevailed in the
legal system, there would be no bargaining obligation. In the First
National Maintenance view of bargaining, collective bargaining is not
necessarily a vehicle that can be used by a firm to attain competitive-
ness. Bargaining is just as frequently a barrier to firm competitiveness.
In this view, competitiveness is solely a management interest, rather
than a joint interest of management and the union.
In deciding First National Maintenance, the Court determined that
all management decisions could be characterized as one of three types
with respect to bargaining: type I, decisions that had a substantial effect
on the employer but only a minimal effect or indirect effect on the
employment interests of employees (e.g., pricing, financing, advertis-
ing); type II, decisions that affected solelyemployment (e.g., wages,
working hours, benefits); and type III, decisions that had a substantial
effect on employment and on the employer (e.g., investment, produc-
tion process, work location, product elimination). Type I decisions
were part of the inherent freedom on the part of management to man-
age its affairs unrelated to employment, and there was no obligation on
the part of the management to bargain over these decisions; type II
decisions carried a bargaining obligation; and type III decisions were
the difficult ones. Those were the ones in which the board would be
required to determine whether the benefits from bargaining out-
weighed the costs the bargaining obligation placed on management in
the conduct of its business (First National Maintenance v. NLRB).
These decisions would also be the ones that would most likely directly
affect competitiveness and employment protection/creation.
Like Fibreboard, First National Maintenance was a case involving
a narrow set of facts wrapped in broad language. In Fibreboard, the
Court found that the employer’s decision to subcontract the work done
by the unionized employees was based solely on labor costs, and found
that the employer was obligated to bargain over the decision. On the
other hand, in First National Maintenance, the Court found that the
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employer’s decision to terminate its maintenance and cleaning contract
with the nursing home had nothing to do with labor costs; therefore, the
employer was not obligated to bargain with the union over the deci-
sion.
The question then became one of interpretation. Under what cir-
cumstances would the benefits to collective bargaining outweigh the
burdens placed on the conduct of business so that bargaining would be
required? Did the circumstances of a particular case bring it closer to
Fibreboard, with its bargaining requirement, or to First National
Maintenance, with no bargaining requirement? Ten years after First
National Maintenance, the NLRB answered this question in Dubuque
Packing Company, 303 NLRB No. 66, 1991 (enf ’d 143 LRRM 301
[DC Cir., 1993]). In this case, the employer, a meatpacking firm,
moved its hog kill operation from a location in Iowa to a location in
Illinois. The question in the case was whether the employer had an
obligation to bargain over this change. The Court distinguished
between an employer decision that resulted in a basic change in the
nature of the business, and one that did not result in such a change. The
former decision would not trigger a bargaining obligation, but the latter
would.
The Court decided that the employer decision in Dubuque was not
a basic change in the nature of the business because it was a decision to
relocate existing work rather than a change in the nature of the work
the firm was doing. It was a decision regarding where the firm should
be in a business (in this case, hog killing), not whether it should be in a
business. It was not new work that the firm was undertaking, nor was
the work being done in a new and different way. Moreover, the Court
found that labor costs were a factor in the decision to move; therefore,
bargaining could possibly have influenced the company’s decision to
relocate the work.
The foregoing discussion indicates that changes in capital structure
or product mix of the firm that were made for the purpose of increasing
firm competitiveness were generally not considered to be negotiable
items with the union, even if such changes resulted in employment
reductions. In such circumstances, the law permitted a decoupling of
employer concerns with competitiveness and union concerns with job
protection and creation. The law regarding the obligation to bargain
permits employers who so choose to avoid discussions with a union
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representing their employees by stating that the decisions are type I
decisions or type III decisions, which are basic changes in the nature of
the business. Disagreements are resolved before the NLRB, resulting
in litigation rather than negotiation. 
The result of all this is that the law in the United States does not
encourage companies and unions to negotiate over matters relating to
competitiveness and job protection/creation. The focus of the law is not
on problem solving or on linking the issues of competitiveness and job
security. Rather, the focus is on the individual employer decision and
whether or not the employer has the right to make that decision without
negotiating with the union about it. Bargaining over competitiveness
and employment protection/creation does occur, but not because the
law encourages it—it occurs because both parties want it to, or because
the employer believes that it cannot make a sufficiently strong case
before the NLRB and the courts to avoid bargaining with the union. 
The Political Environment
There is little government involvement in the bargaining process,
which is indicated by the language quoted earlier from the insurance
agents case. The Taft-Hartley Act (1947) has created the Federal Medi-
ation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), and most states have created
comparable agencies. Among the missions of the FMCS and the state
agencies is the encouragement of labor and management to resolve
their disputes. In addition, the FMCS provides training and other
expert support for parties that wish to move toward a cooperative rela-
tionship (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). There is also a legal require-
ment in the NLRA that the FMCS and the state agency be notified if
there is a labor dispute that has not resulted in an agreement. Although
the FMCS and/or the state agency may contact the parties and offer
their services, there is no legal requirement that the parties avail them-
selves of these services; they are completely voluntary. Indeed, if only
one party declines to use the services, then the FMCS/state agency has
no role.
This minimalist government involvement in bargaining in the
United States may be contrasted with the situation in Canada, its larg-
est trading partner. While Canadian provinces have extensive require-
ments for governmental mediation and conciliation before a work
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stoppage may be commenced, the United States has no requirements
(outside railroads and airlines) for prestrike or prelockout governmen-
tal intervention in the absence of a national emergency. Thus, there is
no requirement for a neutral, ameliorative influence in negotiations that
may encourage otherwise recalcitrant parties to consider jointly
addressing competitiveness and employment protection/creation
(Block 1997).
The Institutional Environment
Just as there is no centralized corporatist structure in the United
States to encourage the use of the collective bargaining systems for
competitiveness and employment protection and creation, there is
nothing in the institutional environment that encourages such a result.
The two major actors, employers and unions, operate within decentral-
ized internal systems. Each of the actors addresses its own internal
interests in collective bargaining. The result is additional impetus for
decentralization and variation in collective bargaining outcomes. 
Employer Institutions
In the United States, there are no overarching employer institutions
that can implement or encourage on a broad-based scale the use of col-
lective bargaining for encouraging competitiveness and employment
protection/creation. Consistent with the principle of decentralized col-
lective bargaining, and in contrast to some other industrialized coun-
tries (Sisson 1987; Pellegrini 1998; Furstenberg 1998; Hammerstrom
and Nilsson 1998), employers in the United States generally do not
form coalitions or work collectively to bargain with unions at all, much
less to encourage the use of the collective bargaining system as a vehi-
cle for competitiveness and employment protection/creation. The
structure of the system is that each employer makes a decision on the
matter that it believes is in its best interest.3 Employers in the United
States are competitive firms first and employers second. They often use
their labor relations systems as a vehicle for competitive advantage vis-
à-vis other firms. Thus, if they believe that collective bargaining can be
used to enhance competitiveness, they will so use it. On the other hand,
if employers believe that collective bargaining makes it more difficult
than otherwise to be competitive, they will resist collective bargaining.
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Similarly, there is no employer institution that encourages the use of
collective bargaining for employment protection.
The employer institutions that do exist, such as the Labor Policy
Association, are primarily political lobbying organizations that dissem-
inate information to the public and policymakers and support a point of
view on labor and employment policy issues. The Labor Policy Associ-
ation describes itself as “the nation’s leading public policy association
of senior human resource executives, representing more than 250
major corporations doing business in the United States.” Among the
items on its agenda is “to encourage legislative and regulatory bodies
to improve labor and employment policies in order to enhance the
competitiveness of companies doing business in the United States and
enable employee friendly workplace practices” (Labor Policy Associa-
tion 2001). Other organizations aim to keep labor relations and human
resources management practitioners up to date. The Employment Pol-
icy Foundation, for example, is a “research and education foundation
that promotes sound employment policy.” It is supported by over 130
leading companies. Similarly, the Society for Human Resource Man-
agement is an information and educational organization.
Union Structures
Just as there is decentralization among employers, there is also
decentralization among unions. The American Federation of Labor
(AFL), established in 1881 as Federation of Unions, was established on
the principle of international union autonomy in collective bargaining
(Brooks 1971). Although the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO), established in 1938, was generally more centralized than the
rival AFL, it too left collective bargaining to the affiliate organizations
(Bernstein 1969). This principle was maintained when the two organi-
zations merged in 1955 to form the AFL-CIO, and it continues in exist-
ence today. Thus, just as there is no centralized system or structure to
encourage employers to move toward, there is no structure to encour-
age unions to consider the use of collective bargaining for competitive-
ness.
The level of the national (or international)4 union in the United
States represents a mixture of union structures and centralization and
decentralization. The structural characteristic common to almost all
unions in the United States is a local union chartered by the national
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union. Thus, at first blush, one might think that the local union is under
the control of the national union, which could be a force for encourag-
ing locals to use collective bargaining as a vehicle for competitiveness.
On the other hand, it is also true that there is wide variation in the
nature of the relationship between local unions and the parent national,
and the amount of autonomy the local has in collective bargaining. In
general, when the negotiations of one local of a national union appear
to affect the interests of another local of a national union, the national
union will attempt to exert some control over the local collective bar-
gaining activities. In addition, most national unions retain the right in
their constitutions to approve collective agreements negotiated by their
local unions. This provides the national with some ultimate control
over the outcomes of bargaining (Fiorito, Gramm, and Hendricks
1991).
Thus, locals that negotiate for only one employer may have an
interest in negotiating for increased competitiveness for that employer.
Such impetus, however, must come from the local itself. The national
union is not likely to encourage it. Whether the national union discour-
ages it depends on whether the national perceives that a contract places
other locals at a disadvantage.
Where multiple locals of the same union negotiate with the same
employer, the national union will normally create a structure to
develop common bargaining proposals. Such a structure can facilitate
the use of collective bargaining to the extent the locals have an interest
in doing so. Such a structure usually results in a multiplant, multilocal
agreement covering wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment. It may also create structures that encourage competitiveness,
such as in the GM–UAW national agreement. Similarly, in the Alcoa
case, we see the national union agreeing with corporate leadership on a
partnership agreement.
Such bargaining structures must be implemented at the plant and
local level. This may be done through a separate plant agreement, as in
the GM–UAW case, or by administration of the master agreement, as
in the Alcoa–Steelworkers case. The major concern of the international
is that the local does not gain work at the expense of the other locals by
a reduction of standards. In the absence of such a concern, the national
union will generally provide the locals with autonomy. 
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Joint and Governmental Structures
There is only one formal overarching joint or governmental struc-
ture that encourages the parties to use collective bargaining to encour-
age competitiveness and employment protection/creation. The
Collective Bargaining Forum was established in 1984 by a group of
corporate chief executive officers and presidents of international
unions under the auspices of the United States Department of Labor. Its
purpose was to “address the role of collective bargaining in helping the
United States maintain a rising standard of living in an increasingly
competitive world economy” (Collective Bargaining Forum 1988). In
April 1999, the forum issued a report entitled Principles for New
Employment Relationships, which continued the theme of the impor-
tance of collective bargaining and mutual respect between employers
and unions. Among the principles to which the report urged adherence
were:
acceptance in practice by union leaders and members of their
responsibility to work with management to improve the economic
performance of their enterprises in ways that serve the interests of
workers, consumers, shareholders, and society and acceptance by
corporations of employment security, the continuity of employ-
ment for its workforce, as a major policy objective that will figure
as importantly in the planning process as product development,
marketing, and capital requirements. (Collective Bargaining
Forum 1999)
This report was announced by the vice president of the United
States at a White House ceremony. It is noteworthy, however, that the
president of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), a
member of the forum, did not sign the report (Collective Bargaining
Forum 1999).
This discussion indicates the extent of decentralization in the U.S.
industrial relations system, both among the actors and between the
actors and government (Collective Bargaining Forum 1999). That the
NAM president chose not to sign the report, although his management
colleagues were willing to do so, suggests that while executives of
individual firms were willing to sign, the representative of a broad
cross-section of industry was unwilling to agree to such principles on
behalf of his constituency. This was the case even with the prestige of a
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vice-presidential announcement. Again, this reinforces the principle
that such overarching structures can do nothing more in the United
States than publicize the view that companies and unions should use
the collective bargaining process to enhance competitiveness and
employment protection/creation.
The Economic Environment
Economic policy in the United States over the last 20 years has
generally taken a laissez-faire approach to employment and competi-
tiveness. There has been little direct intervention in the marketplace to
affect either of these. Rather, U.S. economic policy has been based on
the principle that markets should be permitted to work, and that firms
in general should be unconstrained in their options to allocate
resources to their most productive uses, with a corresponding maximi-
zation of shareholder wealth.
Monetary policy has been based on limiting inflation, enhancing
the operation of the market by reducing an important source of uncer-
tainty. Concerns about job security have helped to restrain wage
increases and, therefore, inflation (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 1997).
Fiscal policy has been generally non-existent. For much of the last
20 years, taxes and government spending have been part of an ideolog-
ical and political debate rather than an economic debate. This ideologi-
cal/political debate is an aspect of a broader debate in the United States
over the wisdom of government involvement in the economy.
Trade policy has advocated open markets and the reduction of bar-
riers in the United States and among its trading partners (U.S. Trade
Representative, Office of, 1999). It is true that the U.S. government
will act, at times, to support domestic industries, such as the steel
industry, that can persuade policymakers that it may be the victim of
unfair trade practices by foreign competitors. Thus, the government
has on occasion advocated for protection based on the position that an
industry has been victimized by unfair trade practices (Lucentini
1999). But the general thrust of U.S. economic policy has been to open
its markets and to expect other countries to do the same (U.S. Trade
Representative, Office of, 1999).
The impact of such economic policies on collective bargaining in
the United States can best be characterized as reinforcing the variation
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that exists in law and the decentralization that the actors have helped to
create. The market approach of the U.S. economic policy has encour-
aged firms to respond to the economic environment by following strat-
egies that are viewed as being in the best interests of the individual
shareholders of the firm. These responses are individualistic and firm
specific rather than coordinated among firms. The individual collective
bargaining system of each firm has been forced to adjust to these firm
strategies enabled by U.S. economic policies.
The foregoing discussion raises an obvious question: given the
absence of systemic encouragement in the United States of the use of
the collective bargaining system for competitiveness and employment
protection, how frequently is the collective bargaining system used?
While there have been case studies and anecdotal information regard-
ing the relationship, they do not address the more general question of
incidence.
Despite the absence of a broad-based data set on the incidence of
innovations, there has been work that attempted to estimate the fre-
quency of such innovations. Summarizing studies published in the
1980s Voos and Eaton (1992) observed that the evidence suggested
that up to 65 percent of unionized firms in the surveys examined had
created some form of innovation that could be considered to have a
competitiveness-based rationale. The most frequent innovations were
information sharing and employee surveys, at over 60 percent of the
surveyed unionized firms. Fifty-one percent of the firms and unions in
one survey had created quality circles, 29–46 percent had instituted
some profit sharing, and 40 percent had established at least one partici-
patory program. Reanalyzing data from a survey done by the U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office, Voos and Eaton determined that some form of
participation was occurring in 79 percent of the unionized firms. Gain
sharing was the least frequent innovation, occurring in 33 percent of
the surveyed firms.
A different view of the frequency of use of collective bargaining as
a vehicle for encouraging competitiveness and employment protection/
creation can be obtained by examining a volume published by the
Industrial Relations Research Association (Voos 1994). This book
examined collective bargaining in the 1980s and early 1990s in many
of the unionized industries in the United States that have been affected
by global competition and domestic market deregulation. Among the
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industries examined were paper, meatpacking, aerospace, steel, auto
assembly, auto parts, trucking, telecommunications, and textile. A
summary of the findings of these industry studies will provide some
rough sense of the frequency of the use of collective bargaining as a
vehicle for competitiveness and employment protection/creation. In a
sense, the findings of this study would represent a lower bound on the
incidence of the use of collective bargaining, because its researchers
focused primarily on the large unionized firms and because the studies
were not designed to examine the phenomenon. Thus, absence of a dis-
cussion of the use of collective bargaining for purposes of competitive-
ness and employment protection/creation does not necessarily mean
that it was not so used in that industry. It is possible that the researcher
simply did not address it. Nevertheless, the studies in this volume pro-
vide useful data.
Table 2.1 presents a summary of the results of the studies in the
volume. The left-hand column displays the processes by which the out-
comes were obtained, the outcomes in the form of shop floor changes,
and the contexts/environments in which these outcomes occurred. An
outcome was considered to have occurred if it appeared in one of the
major firms in the industry.
The great diversity in U.S. collective bargaining has been docu-
mented elsewhere (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996), and this diversity is
evident in analyzing the incidence of the use of collective bargaining as
a vehicle for addressing issues of competitiveness and job protection/
creation. In some industries, the collective bargaining system has been
used a great deal to address these problems; in others, less so. Paper,
steel, aerospace, auto assembly, and telecommunications have all used
the collective bargaining system as a vehicle for increasing firm com-
petitiveness in at least one of the firms in the industry. This has been
less the case for auto parts, motor carrier transportation, meatpacking,
and textiles.
Competitiveness
With respect to competitiveness, the table suggests that auto
assembly and steel are ahead of the other industries as sectors in which
at least one of the major firms and unions is using the collective bar-
gaining system as a tool to increase competitiveness. Auto assembly
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has instituted production teams, flexible classifications, joint training,
pay for knowledge, and extensive employee involvement. The steel
industry, primarily National Steel, has formal information sharing,
company-financed training, profit sharing, work restructuring, and
joint labor–management committees at all levels. In both of these
cases, such changes were jointly agreed upon rather than being forced
on the union by hard employer bargaining. The telecommunications
industry has instituted company-financed training and variable pay.
Similarly, aerospace has instituted consultation on technological
change, total quality management systems, and quality of work life
systems with training.
The paper industry has also used collective bargaining as a vehicle
for increasing firm competitiveness. A major difference between the
paper industry and the auto assembly, steel, telecommunications, and
aerospace industries was the process by which the changes in the tradi-
tional collective bargaining system were implemented. In paper, the
changes were made after hard bargaining by employers, and followed
de-unionization campaigns by some paper companies in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. 
On the other hand, there was no substantial use of collective bar-
gaining as a vehicle to increase in competitiveness in the meatpacking,
auto parts, and motor carrier industries. All of these industries were
characterized by strong de-unionization movements or substantial non-
union sectors.
Recently, Gray, Myers, and Myers (1999) examined the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics file of collective agreements covering 1,000
workers or more that expired between September 1, 1997, and Septem-
ber 30, 2007. Of the 1,041 agreements in the study, 154 (or 14.8 per-
cent) covering 854,803 workers contained contract provisions
requiring high-performance work practices, generally designed to
increase productivity and quality, reduce costs, increase the focus on
the customer, and ultimately, improve the firm’s competitiveness.
These include continuous improvement and employee involvement
programs, team concept, job security thorough training and multiskill-
ing, creation of an oversight committee, and no layoffs due to the
implementation of new work practices.
Two recent studies provide insight into whether unionization
affects the frequency of innovative work practices. Based on a study
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using a sample of 664 establishments in 1992 from the Dun and Brad-
street establishment file, Osterman (1994) found that roughly two-
thirds of the establishments in which 50 percent of the core workers
(defined as those workers who are actually involved in making the
product produced by, or delivering the service provided by, the estab-
lishment) participate had at least one of four identified practices
(teams, job rotation, total quality management, and quality circles).
There was no evidence that collective bargaining was related to the use
of such programs. Gittleman, Horrigan, and Joyce (1998) also found no
union effect on the incidence of work practices. Their estimates, based
on a data set from the U.S. Department of Labor, found that 42 percent
of all establishments, but about 70 percent of establishments with 50 or
more employees, had one of six practices.5
Employment Protection/Creation
The U.S. collective bargaining system has not been able to generate
widespread employment guarantees. Rather, employment security and
job protection is obtained through the success of the firm. Put differ-
ently, there is very little administered job protection or job security
developed through the U.S. collective bargaining system. In general,
job security is market-based. This phenomenon is illustrated in Table
2.1.
The results presented by Gray, Myers, and Myers (1999) support
the assertion that administered job security is rare in the United States.
Of the agreements covering 1,000 workers or more, only 22 of the
agreements (2.1 percent) covering 123,811 workers had explicit provi-
sions prohibiting layoffs, and only 14 agreements (1.3 percent) cover-
ing 32,537 workers had no subcontracting provisions.
The most well-developed job security system in the United States
is in the automobile assembly industry in the 1996 agreement between
General Motors (GM) and the United Auto Workers (UAW) Union, in
which both parties negotiated a system of secured employment levels
(SELs). According to the agreement, the SEL system prohibits layoffs
for any reason except market-related volume reductions, reasons
beyond the control of the corporation (“acts of God”), sale of part of
the corporation, model change or plant rearrangement, or layoff of an
employee recalled to a temporary vacancy. National Steel and the
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United Steelworkers of America, as part of their cooperative partner-
ship, have negotiated job security over the life of the collective agree-
ment (Arthur and Smith 1994).
Conclusion on Incidence
The results of this analysis indicate that while there has been much
written about new work practices and the use of collective bargaining
as a means for improving firm competitiveness in the United States,
multiple provisions encouraging or requiring the parties to create spe-
cial structures for competitiveness are found only in a minority of
major collective agreements. There continues to be a bias in the U.S.
collective bargaining system toward retaining the formalism in the tra-
ditional, adversarial U.S. model of collective bargaining. As unioniza-
tion does not appear to be related to the frequency of such practices, it
suggests that the preference of the parties to collective bargaining for
the traditional model is comparable to the extent of the preference to
maintain the traditional hierarchical system of work organization. 
This does not mean that unions and employers are not working
toward competitiveness. As the case studies demonstrate, such efforts
are often ad hoc and not incorporated into agreements. Indeed, parties
often prefer to avoid placing such programs in the collective agreement
because placing them in the agreement reduces the flexibility of either
party to pull out if it wishes. In essence, placing the cooperative pro-
cess within the requirements of the legally enforceable collective
agreement is inconsistent with the essential voluntariness of coopera-
tion. Nevertheless, these results suggest that formal collective bargain-
ing provisions addressing competitiveness and employment protection/
creation efforts are not as common as might be thought based on the
literature.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There are no societal institutions in the United States that encour-
age unions and employers to use the collective bargaining system for
purposes of firm competitiveness and employee job security. While the
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law enables collective bargaining to be used for this purpose, the law
does not require it. In addition, the decentralized structure of unioniza-
tion permits employers to explore competitiveness options away from
the union. Legal ambiguity about whether firm investment decisions
are negotiable, along with associated litigation, reduces the likelihood
that collective bargaining will be used to address competitiveness and
job security.
Government in the United States generally has little involvement
in collective bargaining, as bargaining is seen as a matter for the par-
ties. Nongovernmental aggregating institutions for management are
lobbying, advocacy, or educational organizations, and do not encour-
age collective bargaining as a vehicle for addressing competitive and
job security. On the union side, although union structures may have the
potential for encouraging use of bargaining for competitiveness and
job security, decentralized bargaining makes it difficult for high-level
union structures to impose outcome preferences on lower-level struc-
tures.
The result of this is great variability in the extent to which firms
and industries use collective bargaining to address issues of firm com-
petitiveness and job security. Some firms and industries have actively
used their bargaining systems to pursue competitiveness; others have
not. Job security is rarely provided explicitly; rather, it is linked to
competitiveness.
Notes
The author thanks Ms. Betty Barrett for her research assistance.
1. Whether public policy in the United States succeeds in protecting that choice is a
matter of debate. See, for example, U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor
(1994) and Block, Beck, and Kruger (1996).
2. Employees of private, for-profit health care institutions had been previously cov-
ered through the board’s normal exercise of jurisdiction.
3. A notable exception to this rule is in over-the-road trucking and automobile haul-
ing. See Belzer (1994).
4. The highest union level in the United States often designates itself an international
union, perhaps because it may have membership in Canada.
5. See Appelbaum and Batt (1994) for a review of survey evidence on the incidence
of new work systems in the United States without taking into account unioniza-
tion. Appelbaum and Batt indicate that up to 85 percent of the firms in the United
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States had at least one practice in one facility, but the percentage dropped to as
low as 25 percent on multiple practices.
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